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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LINCOLN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
d/b/a CHEVY CHASE APARTMENTS, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
DOROTHY S. FERRIER, 
Defendant, 
Cross Claimant, 
and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The Plaintiff-Respondent, hereinafter called Respondent, controverts 
the statement of the kind of case of Defendant-Appellant, hereinafter called 
Appellant, in the following particulars: 
1• This action was commenced by Respondent against Appellant on a 
written "month to month" lease agreement and also pursuant to Title 78, 
Chapter 36, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, said lease being referred 
to in the complaint and a copy thereof attached to the complaint on file 
(R. 1-3, inc.)-
2. Bie answer and counterclaim on file did not conform to the 
requirements of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 8-12, inc.)* 
Case No. 1l|296 
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3• The counterclaim on file includes matters in the same count 
which are independent of the issue of unlawful detainer, or a defense thereto 
(R. 9-12, inc.). 
Ihe Respondent, to save space and repetition, will abbreviate the 
following throughout this brief, namely: Record as "R. "j inclusive 
as "inc."; Appellant's Brief as "App. Br.,fj Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, as "U.C.A"; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as "U.R.C.P"; and Title 
78, Chapter 36, U.C.A., 1953, entitled Forcible Entry and Detainer, as 
"Unlawful Detainer." 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Hie lower court, the Honorable Calvin Gould, District Judge, presiding, 
granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment on its complaint, and the 
court ordered that Appellant's answer and counterclaim be stricken as a 
sham pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a judgment were made and entered accordingly 
(R. 26-30, inc.). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The lower court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment 
should not be disturbed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent controverts the Appellant's statement of facts in the 
following particulars: 
1« The Appellant's statement of facts is argumentative and recites 
matters not in evidence, not relevant to this appeal, and not helpful to 
-2-
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resolution of the issues on this appeal. 
2. The pleadings on file speak for themselves (R. 1-5, inc., and 
8-12, inc.). 
A concise statement of facts is reflected by the record. The Respondent 
was the landlord, and Appellant was the tenant, of apartment #22 in an 
apartment house complex known as Chevy Chase in Weber County, Utah, as is 
more fully set out in the complaint and in Exhibit "A" attached to the 
complaint on file (R. 1-3, inc.). On June 10, 1975, Respondent issued a 
notice directed to Appellant terminating her tenancy at the end of June, 1975, 
(R. 5), and said notice was personally served on Appellant by the Weber County 
Sheriff's Office on June 10, 1975, (R. U). Appellant failed to vacate said 
premises on or before July 1, 1975, and this action was commenced by a com-
plaint filed on July 25, 1975, (R» 1), and process was served on Appellant 
by the Weber County Sheriff's Office on July 31, 1975, (R. 6-7, inc.). On 
August 21, 1975, a default judgment was entered (R. 1ii), and on the same day 
an answer and counterclaim was filed with a copy mailed to Respondent's 
counsel (R. 8-12, inc.). The certificate of mailing shows August 20, 1975, 
but, in any event, the answer was not received until August 22, 1975, (R» 39) • 
The answer and counterclaim on file is signed by the Appellant, but is not 
signed by an attorney (R. 12)• 
On August 25, 1975, some four days after the answer was filed, 
Appellant caused a tender of rent for two months to be filed and mailed 
(R. 15-16). 
On September 2, 1975, Respondent prepared and served a consent to set 
-3-
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aside the default judgment, and motions for summary judgment and dismissal 
(R. 18-19). Appellant objected to Respondent's motions (R. 20-22, inc.). 
Hie Respondent's motions were argued to the lower court on September 10, 
1975, (R« 2$), and following the oral and written decision (R. 2U) of the 
lower court, findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment were entered 
on September 29, 1975, (R. 26-30, inc.)* 
The Appellant formally tendered possession of the premises to Respondent 
in open court on September |0, 1975, although she may have vacated the same 
the prior weekend which would be on or about September 6, 1975, (R» UU and 
U7-U8). 
The record recited above is not in dispute. It should be noted that 
the lower court struck Appellant's answer and counterclaim as a sham 
pursuant to Rule 11, U.R.C.P., so that there was nothing before that court 
which would permit it to pass on the merits of Appellant's claims. The 
Appellant's statement of facts assumes that the merits of her claims were 
before the lower court, and are now before this Court. It is not clear how 
the merits of the issues raised by the answer and counterclaim could be 
before either court if the answer and counterclaim was properly stricken. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT TO POINTS OF ARGUMENT 
The Respondent will answer Appellant's points in the order raised, but 
Respondent deems it necessary for an orderly exposition of its position to 
give this Court an overview of the complex and important issues raised by this 
appeal. The Appellant has attempted to narrow the battlefield by her four 
points of argument, but the ultimate significant issues herein are as follows: 
-U- . 
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1. The rights of a landlord to select and regulate his tenants, 
to rely upon his written leases, and to rely upon the written statute 
and case law for guidance in the control and eviction of tenants; 
2. The relationship and function of the unlawful detainer statutes 
in evictions where there is a written lease; and 
3. The power of this Court to adopt and enforce rules of procedure 
which are controlling on the conduct of attorneys and litigants• 
The law of landlord and tenant has passed through a convulsion with the 
pendulum swinging from protection of property rights to protection of 
personal rights• The tenants are now demanding rights verging on total 
ownership of the properties rented by them including, but not limited to, 
rights to designate management, make rules and regulations, withhold rents, 
demand improvements, and so on, without concomitant duties to preserve and 
protect the premises and the peace* Conversely, the landlords are so beset 
with legal actions on every conceivable theory that they are becoming afraid 
to own or manage rental properties* The upshot is that private capital is 
fleeing, government capital has become necessary, and rental premises are 
ever diminishing and depreciating to the consternation of every major city 
in the United States. 
Hie unlawful detainer statutes were enacted in Utah prior to the turn 
of the century for the following salutory reasons: (a) To avoid breaches 
of the peace; (b) To provide a quick and inexpensive procedure for 
eviction in lieu of ejectment; (c) To provide protection to the tenant 
against either forcible or surreptitious evictions without due process 
-5-
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of law. King v. Firm, 3 U. 2d U19, 285 P. 2d 111U, 1118; 52A C.J.S., 
Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 752, et seq. The Respondent respectfully suggests 
that the unlawful detainer statutes are in no way a derogation of written 
leases, except where the statutes and the lease are in direct conflict, 
e. g., the right of forcible entry, and that Section 78-36-3, U.C.A., 
makes specific reference therein to written leases. Somehow, Appellant 
assumes and argues that an unlawful detainer action extinguishes the written 
lease and terras thereof. Respondent believes that the unlawful detainer 
statutes merely gave the landlord an alternative possessory remedy in return 
for landlord's loss of right of entry commonly provided for at common law 
and In written leases. Statutes providing summary proceedings for recovery 
of possession by the landlord do not establish a new cause of action, but 
merely create an additional and cumulative remedy. f>2A C.J.S., Landlord 
and Tenant, Sec. 753 & 758. This position is further bolstered by Voyles v« 
Straka, 77 Utah 171, 175, 292 Pac. 913 (1930), wherein this Court held that 
the right to recover rents is separate from the right to recover possession, 
and that the two rights are not merged by the unlawful detainer statutes. 
The Appellant acknowledges the better practice might be to separate 
the lease claims from the unlawful detainer claims in separate counts, 
but objection was not made thereto, both claims were based on a twenty day 
summons (rather than a three day), and it has always been the policy of the 
law to avoid multiplicity of actions. 
The remaining significant public policy issue in this case involves 
the control of members of the bar by the courts in the judicial process. 
-6-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The wave of the future may very well be the extensive use of paralegals 
by attorneys, for which see attached exhibits from recent periodicals. 
Paralegals are not subject to discipline nor control by the courts or 
bar associations* They are unidentified and anonymous, hiding behind the 
cloak of a licensed lawyer, yet wielding great power and authority when 
not totally supervised. An exconvict client of this writer suggests that 
the best lawyers in the country are in the penitentiaries, and the thought 
is intriguing as to what these paralegals could do if the bar associations 
and courts abdicate their authority. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED 
RESPONDENT REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The landlord-tenant relationship between Respondent and Appellant 
was based upon a written agreement which contained therein, paragraph 9, 
a provision for attorney's fees (R. 3)* The complaint on file specifically 
refers to, and incorporates, said lease as a part of said complaint (R. 1-3, 
inc.). The action was commenced on a twenty day summons (R. 6), so that 
summary "unlawful detainer" proceedings are not inconsistent with an action 
on the lease. 
This Court has held that reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded 
to the prevailing party when provided for by statute or contract. Blake v. 
Blake, 1? U.2d 369, 372, 1*12 P.2d k9xi Pacific Coast Title v, Hartford 
Ace. & Ind. Co., 7 U.2d 377, 325 P.2d 906. 
These proceedings were necessary because of Appellant's refusal to 
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vacate. Tender of rent after unlawful detainer arose is irrelevant, and 
acceptance of such rent by Respondent would have waived the unlawful detainer. 
J>2A C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 7?l*. 
An argument can be made, as it was in Milliner v. Farmer, 2\x U.2d 326, 
U71 P*2d 151, that a written lease is extinguished by commencement of 
unlawful detainer proceedings. This Court skirted the issue in the Milliner 
case by noting a stipulation in said case. Trie fact is, however, that an 
unlawful detainer proceeding is a cumulative remedy only, 52A C.J.S., 
Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 753 and 758, and Voyles v. Straka, supra, and 
that many issues involved in a lease cannot be resolved in an unlawful 
detainer proceeding. If this Court holds that a written lease and all pro-
visions therein are extinguished by unlawful detainer proceedings, then, 
and in such event, an oral month to month tenancy is superior to a written 
lease, summary proceedings are not available to a landlord on a written 
lease without waiver of the lease, and the landlord will be deprived of one 
of the few protections he has, namely, of evicting a tenant efficiently 
and inexpensively without waiving such issues as damages to the premises 
and other breaches of the lease agreement which often can only be determined 
after eviction. 
The Respondent respectfully suggests that much of the existing 
confusion concerning the applicability of the unlawful detainer law to 
written leases arises out of this Court's extension of the use of unlawful 
detainer to vendor-vendee transactions. Appellant has made a bold effort 
to perpetuate this confusion by citing Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 
.8-
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Pac. 206, and Leone V. Zuniga, 8U Utah 1*17, 3k P-2d 699, both of which 
initially involved real estate contracts* The real estate contracts were 
forfeited, extinguished in theory, and the vendee was converted to a tenant 
at will, following which unlawful detainer proceedings were commenced. In 
other words, the vendor elected an option to extinguish the real estate 
contract, leaving only an oral landlord-tenant relationship in existence 
for the court to pass on in unlawful detainer proceedings. An action for 
unlawful detainer presupposes existence of the relation of landlord and 
tenant, Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, $7 Pac. 882, and is not 
available for use in the vendor-vendee relationship. A written lease 
presupposes a landlord-tenant relationship and does not require any con-
version to another relationship. 
Incidentally, the Court will note that Appellant alleges and prays 
for attorneys fees in her counterclaim (R. 10-11) without either contract 
or statute to support the same. The writer would hope that one day this 
Court will explicitly rule on the propriety of such allegation and prayer, 
and whether such attorneys fees may be awarded as a part of damages where 
exemplary damages are claimed. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Respondent did not waive its 
written lease by commencement of unlawful detainer proceedings, and that 
Respondent is entitled to the benefits of said lease cumulatively, and 
not in lieu of the unlawful detainer statutes. 
-9-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ARBITRARILY AWARD 
RESPONDENT TREBLE DAMAGES 
The Appellant states her Point II in a manner that Respondent cannot 
disagree with. Of course, "triple damage should not be arbitrarily awarded." 
The issue is whether treble damages were arbitrarily awarded. And the 
arbitrariness of such award depends upon whether Appellant continued in 
unlawful detainer, and not whether she tendered rent. 
The case of Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 Pac. 206, so often 
cited by Appellant, on page 156 of Utah Reports quotes with approval from 
Eccles v. U. P. Coal Co., 15 Utah 1U, 20, 1*8 Pac. 1U8, that "The Statute ... 
makes it mandatory upon the court to render judgment for three times the 
damages assessed" after a finding of damages. And the Forrester case, supra, 
also holds that rents and profits, or rental value, during the unlawful 
detention of the premises are included in damages, as damages and not rent. 
After the unlawful detainer arose, the tender of rent became irrelevant, 
because the wrong is in the detainer and not in failure to pay rent. 
Both the lease agreement, paragraph 9, (R. 3) and Section 78-36*3(2), 
U.C.A., provide that the tenant may be directed to vacate upon fifteen 
days notice. The Respondent had the right to direct the Appellant to 
vacate for any legal reason, or for no reason at all. Callister v* Spencer, 
113 Utah U97, 196 P.2d 71UJ Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 6875 App. Br. 18. 
Hie Respondent caused a notice to vacate to be served on the Appellant 
by the Weber County Sheriff's Office on June 10, 1975, some twenty days 
before the end of the month (R. 3-U)* The Appellant was in unlawful detainer 
-10-
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of the subject premises on July 1, 1975, when she failed and refused to 
vacate by that day. 
This Court is respectfully directed to the additional care and patience 
extended to Appellant by Respondent in this case, namely: (a) legal 
proceedings were not commenced until July 25, 1975* (R« 1){ (b) Appellant 
was not served with process until July 31, 1975, (R« 7); (c) the summons 
provided for a full twenty days in which to answer the complaint (R. 6), 
as contrasted with the three day minimum provided for in Section 78 -36-8, 
U.C.A, 1953; and (d) the Respondent refused to take any steps to enter 
Appellant's premises until the formal tender thereof in open court, in the 
absence of a prior tender by delivery of the keys, (R. 6U). 
According to Appellant counsel's representations, Appellant vacated 
at the earliest, Saturday, September 6, 1975, and formal tender was made 
September 10, 1975, in open court, (App. Br. 9$ R* 1*7). The Court will 
note from the briefs that the offices of counsel for the respective parties 
are separated by a short distance, yet the answer and counterclaim were 
filed on the day of default, and mailed without any tender indications made 
at that time of either possession or rent. 
The Appellant makes reference in her statement of facts that "The 
premises were owned by an absentee financial corporation under a resident 
manager ...ff (App. Br. 3). This statement is no more relevant than is the 
fact that Appellant was a public welfare recipient (R. U5), but the point 
is that Respondent would certainly have preferred the recovery of its premises 
without the enormous expenses and worry incurred herein, rather than a paper 
-11-
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judgment of dubious value* % *f \ **•* '*•'' J + ;^ ^ 
ftie Appellant arbitrarily elected to remain on real estate owned by 
another, after having been directed in accordance with law to vacate, and 
so it is difficult for Respondent to understand how it can be claimed that 
the trial court "arbitrarily11 penalized the Appellant. It is customary 
for persons to be penalized when they unlawfully possess and use property 
belonging to others. Appellant remained on Respondents premises for 
approximately two months and ten days after she was directed to vacate. 
Incidentally, Respondent feels obliged to respond to Appellantfs state-
ments made on page 9 of her brief, wherein Appellant refers to comments 
made by this writer relative to return of the keys (R. 6U). The Respondent 
respectfully points out its "no win" position in this case when the Appellant 
argues that a formal tender of the premises was not necessary by delivery 
of the keys, and yet it is obvious from the Appellant's answer and counter-
claim on file (R. 8-12, inc.) that if Respondent had taken any steps to 
take possession without a formal tender, then its liability for forcible 
entry would have been enhanced, and its defense to this appeal diminished. 
It is a favorite game of tenants in recent times to leave a few items behind 
to "set the landlord up" for a forcible entry lawsuit promoted by a legal 
services or civil rights organization. Further, whatever was discussed 
between Appellant and her counsel is irrelevant to this writer and Respondent, 
since Respondent had instructions not to converse with Appellant, and pro-
fessional ethics require this writer, as counsel, to receive communications 
from the other counsel. Counsel for Appellant does not contend that he 
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personally made a tender of the premises to this writer prior to the day 
of argument to the trial court. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the trial court did not arbitrarily 
award treble damages to Respondent, but that such damages were well within 
his discretion, if not mandatorily required of him. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE APPELLANT'S 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM TO BE A SHAM PLEADING 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads as follows: 
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall 
be signed in his individual name by at least one attorney 
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah* The 
address of the attorney and that of the party shall be stated. 
Every party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign 
his pleadings and state his address. Except when otherwise 
specifically provided by rule, pleadings need not be verified 
or accompanied by an affidavit. The signature of any attorney 
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; 
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief 
there is good ground to support it, and that it is not inter-
posed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed 
with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule it may be 
stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as 
though the pleading had not been filed. For a wilful violation 
of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate dis-
ciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous 
or indecent matter is inserted. 
Rule 11 is mandatory, clear and unequivocal. 
The Federal Courts have said that the purpose of Rule 11, F.R.C.P., 
is to hold the attorney of record who signs the pleading to strict account-
ability, and to keep out of the pleadings false facts and issues which 
the signing attorney knows to be false. See, American Auto Assn. v. Rothman, 
(D.C.N.Y., 1952) 10iiF. Supp. 6$$| Freeman v. Kirby, (D.C.N.Y., 1961) 27 F.R.D. 
395* According to Freeman v. Kirby, supra, the duty on the attorney is an 
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affirmative duty to certify to the pleadings. 
This writer confesses that times are changing, lawyers are more bold 
and less disciplined, and the public is more intelligent and litigious. 
Bar associations are promoting specialisation, efficiency, and the use of 
paralegals. Courts are encouraging laymen to represent themselves, and 
the time may be approaching when lawyers are truly an unnecssary evil in 
our society. This case poses some of the problems squarely for this Court 
to speak on. 
Counsel for Appellant refused to state into the record who prepared 
the answer and counterclaim on file and the trial judge indicated he did 
not feel that he had the authority to force such statement in the record 
(R. 50~51). The exact scenario reads as follows: 
MR. BRANN: lour Honor, I want answered first who prepared 
the answer and counterclaim. 
MR. VLAHOS: None of your business. 
MR. BRANN: I want this in the record, your Honor. 
MR. VLAHOS: It is none of your business. 
THE COURT: He is not willing to tell you. 
MR. VLAHOS: I am prepared to subscribe my name to all pleadings. 
MR. BRANN: Well, as I indicated, your Honor, I believe that 
an issue in this case is the matter of paralegal people who are not 
admitted to the bar practicing law before the bar. 
THE COURT: Well, and that may be something that you would 
iV
 want to produce evidence on, but I don't know I can compel him to 
say who prepared the pleadings. 
Respondent respectfully suggests that it is a fair inference from the 
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record the Appellant's counsel did not prepare the answer and counterclaim, 
and that his failure to sign the same was not the result of neglect or 
inadvertance. Ihe fact is that the answer and counterclaim does not contain 
a signature line for counsel, nor the address of Appellant (R. 12) • This 
is not the only experience this writer has had with pleadings not signed 
by Appellant's counsel. 
Respondent does believe that this Court has authority to ask Appellant's 
counsel: (a) who prepared the answer and counterclaim; (b) did you read 
it before it was filed; and (c) was the lack of an attorney's signature 
line and signature the result of neglect or inadvertance. 
The fact is that Appellant's counsel has an admirable and efficient 
legal business involving knowledgeable paralegals who free counsel for 
court appearances. Among these paralegals is an individual trained in the 
law, but not licensed to practice in the State of Utah, who has jousted 
with the Utah State Bar right up to the U. S. Supreme Court for admittance. 
See, Sam A. Herscovitz v. Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, 
U07 U. S. 92U, 32 L.Ed. 2d 811, 92 S. Ct. 2l#7. Some paralegal pleadings 
are practically identifiable by the repetitious allegations of wilful 
misconduct and enormous prayers for general damages, exemplary damages, 
and attorney's fees. 
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that such paralegals are smarter, 
more able, and more knowledgeable than members of the Bar, the fact remains 
that there are no controls unless the Bar, and the judiciary, take control. 
A great social and professional issue is involved here that must be carefully 
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analyzed and circumscribed with proper consideration given the changing 
times. If there are not any rules governing paralegals, then all lawyers 
should be so notified in order that they can remain competitive. 
After the foregoing commentary, the Respondent directs its attention 
to the arguments made by Appellant. First, the fact that Appellant signed 
her pleading does not rectify the mandatory requirement that counsel must 
sign the pleading where Appellant is represented by counsel. The thrust 
of Appellant's argument is that she is now, and was, represented by counsel, 
and certainly the pleading was prepared in a law office. The requirement 
of Rule 11, U.R.C.P, cannot be circumvented as a matter of course by the 
litigant signing or the attorney certfying to the pleading after the fact. 
Respondent concedes that Appellant is entitled to represent herself 
in judicial proceedings, but there is not any pretense that she is doing 
so in this case. 
The case cited by Appellant, namely, West Mountain Lime and Stone Co* 
v. DariLey, 38 Utah 218, 111 Pac. 61*7, was decided in 1910. The Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure were adopted in 19U9 and became effective in 19^0. 
Presumably, this Court was mindful of the West Mountain lime case, supra, 
when it adopted Rule 11, U.R.C.P., and, in any case, the salutory rule in 
that case could possibly apply again if inadvertance or neglect were the 
reasons for such amission of counsel's signature with subsequent ratification. 
Finally, in reference to the case of West Mountain Lime, supra, the 
Respondent respectfully suggests: (a) The defect was timely objected 
to in this case by motion; (b) The issue of "retaliatory eviction" was 
•16-
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moot by the time of argument to the trial court, since Appellant had vacated 
the premises; (c) The answer and counterclaim was dismissed as a "shamj' 
but not with prejudice; (d) The Appellant did not submit any meritorious 
reason to the trial court, nor does she submit any such reason to this Court, 
for the omission of counsel's signature; and (e) A separate tort claim is 
not properly joined in unlawful detainer proceedings. 
Appellant's counsel argued to the trial court, in substance, and now 
argues in his brief on appeal, that he has an absolute right to ignore 
Rule 11, U.R.C.P., at the preparation and filing stages of pleadings, and 
that the defect is cured by an offer to cure the defect at the court 
appearance stage. But this position ignores the authority of the judiciary, 
and the right of the adverse party to be assured that a pleading is certified 
to by an attorney as having been read by him and that "there is good ground 
to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay.11 
Respondent respectfully submits that the trial court acted within its 
discretion as delineated by Rule 11, U.R.C.P., and that the trial court 
would have been remiss in its duty had it not stricken the Appellant's 
pleading herein. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S POINT IV IS WHOLLY IRRELEVANT TO ANT ' 
ISSUES THAT SHE MIGHT MAINTAIN IN THIS APPEAL* 
It is difficult to frame a responsive headnote to Appellant's rhetorical 
Point IV because even Respondent must concede that there are circumstances 
under which "retaliatory eviction" may be a defense to unlawful detainer. 
-17-
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The fact is that such defense is irrelevant in this appeal proceeding 
because: 
1. The issue of eviction became settled and moot prior to the 
lover court order herein when Appellant voluntarily vacated the premises 
in question, and the premises were tendered back to Respondent during 
argument before the lower court and prior to its order herein appealed 
fromj and 
2. The Appellant's counterclaim was dismissed as a "sham" 
pursuant to Rule 11, U.R.C.P., and Not because it failed to state a claim 
or defense* 
Ibis Court has always conformed to the basic rule that a judicial 
tribunal may consider and determine only an existing controversy, and not 
a moot question or abstract proposition. University of Utah v. Industrial 
Commission,6U Utah 273, 276, 229 Pac. 11035 1 C.J.S., Actions, Sec. 17* 
The Respondent dislikes being drawn into useless argument over an 
irrelevant and collateral issue, but Respondent is also reluctant to appear 
to avoid the thirteen pages (1$ to 28) of argument made by Appellant, 
which constitutes almost half of her brief. Also, Respondent frankly wants 
an authoritative statement from this Court concerning "retaliatory eviction,lf 
and the circumstances under which it might apply, therefore, the Respondent 
respectfully summarizes the conclusions to be derived from said 13 pages of 
Appellants brief, namely: * . -.-•., 
1. That "retaliatory eviction" may constitute a defense to an 
action for unlawful detainer in cases where law or public policy encourages 
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tenants to speak or act, namely, reporting violations of law to public 
authorities involving housing, health, safety, workmen's compensation and 
civil rights codes. 
2. That some states have enacted legislation pertaining to 
"retaliatory evictions •tl 
3. That Appellant claims a constitutional right to commandeer 
the Respondent's apartment house complex, designate the management thereof, 
and determine the rules and regulations under which Appellant is willing to 
live while residing on Respondents property. 
An extensive discussion and analysis of the concept of retaliatory 
eviction with cases cited is found in 3 Utah Law Review, Fall, 1973* at 
pages $03 et seq. The case of Aluli v. Trusdell, 508 P.2d 1217, Hawaii 
1973* is criticised in said article as a "backward step,11 but the fact is 
that even Hawaii, in the vanguard of tenants rights, found it must give the 
landlord some rights* 
The Respondent again respectfully directs the Court's attention to the 
following undisputed facts contained in the record and the Appellant's 
brief, namely, that Respondent's property is a "non-slum apartment complex" 
(App. Br., 1J>), that Appellant made no complaints to public authorities 
concerning conditions adverse to health, welfare, or safety on the premises 
(R. 8-12, inc.), that Appellantwas a "month to month" tenant under a 
written lease (R. 3), and that Respondent followed the law announced by 
the Utah legislature and this Court in its effort to regain possession of 
the premises with liberal periods of time given Appellant between the time 
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the notice to quit was served and this action was commenced. The Appellant 
was served with a notice to quit on June 10, 1975, this action was filed 
on July 25, 197$, defendant was served with process July 31 , 1915$ and the 
answer was not filed until August 21, 1975* The Appellant, according to 
her counsel's version, quit the premises on or about September 6, 1975* 
(R. U7), and the premises were not formally tendered to Respondent until 
argument on September 10, 1975, (R. U7 & U8). 
The Utah legislature has not seen fit to adopt a proposed model 
landlord-tenant code, although it is reported that such code was vigorously 
debated and thereupon rejected in the last special session of the legislature. 
Respondent does not argue the fact that the legislature has the authority 
to enact landlord-tenant laws, but that is a different matter from asking 
this Court to legislate. 
The thrust of Appellant's argument in this case is that the Appellant 
has an absolute and constitutionally guaranteed right to free speech 
which is a defense to eviction in all cases. Appellant, in effect, 
contends that Respondent, as a private citizen and property owner, may 
be compelled to submit to verbal abuse and thereby forfeit its right 
to select its tenants and manage its properties. Appellant has not 
cited in thirteen pages of its brief, insofar as Respondent can determine, 
one case which holds that the bare right of free speech is a defense to 
eviction. Every case cited by Appellant appears to involve a public 
policy issue such as race relations, or making of complaints to public 
-20-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
authorities concerning a breach of the landlord's duties imposed by lav* 
The Appellant notes that the apartment house complex in this case is not 
a slum property (App. Br. 15>), and Appellant makes no mention in her plead-
ings or brief of complaints made to any public authority. The Appellant 
claims as a defense the bare right to organize a tenant's union, to 
instruct Respondent as to who it can employ to manage the premises, and 
to determine what rules and regulations are appropriate to the convenience 
of Appellant. 
Respondent respectfully directs the Court's attention to the growth 
of multiple unit dwellings where many people of different ages and in-
clinations must live together and remain civilized. The landlords are 
regularly sued nowdays for failure to control their tenants and tenants1 
pets, for failure to repair, for failure not to get consent before 
repairing, for failure to evict, for failure to regulate and provide 
rules, in this case for evicting, and so on ad nauseam. 
The Respondent respectfully submits that the issue of retaliatory 
eviction is moot in this case, and, in any event, that Appellant has 
failed to present a fact situation where the defense of retaliatory 
eviction might be available to her in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings and judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
The allegations of Respondent's complaint, and the lower court's findings 
thereon, are uncontroverted in every respect. The answer and counter-
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claim filed by Appellant did not comply with the express requirements 
of Rule 11, U.R.C.P., and the lower court1 s judgment thereon is in 
compliance with said Rule. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Respondent att
Richard W. Brann 
U06 Kiesel Building 
Ogden, Utah 8U*01 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of Respondent's brief, 
postage prepaid, this yL—'day of December, 197$, to Appellant's 
attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, Esq., 2kk7 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah, 8Ui01• 
Lu, J 
Attorney for Respondent 
Richard W. Brann 
1*06 Kiesel Building 
Ogden, Utah 61*1*01 
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Legal /via 
\More Services Are Performed by Paralegals; 
\ Attorneys Have Mixed Feeling About Trend 
By PHILIP REYZIN f 
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOCRNAL j 
Pat Hausberg, Jo Ann Tackovich and) 
Mayda Estremera are doing legal work with-' 
out a license, but they aren't breaking the' 
law. 
The three work, respectively, at a big 
Wall Street law firm, the legal department 
of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. in Akron, 
\ and at a neighborhood law center in Brook-' 
iyn. ! 
They are paralegals, a new and rapidly1 
spreading breed of law practitioners who 
have never been to law school, but who have 
.had legal training. They are showing up in 
increasing numbers in law firms, corpora-
tions and government offices around the 
U.S. If the system works, they should be an 
important, factor in holding down legal costs 
and bringing legal services to many who 
currently can't afford them. 
Most attorneys are behind the idea of 
using paralegals, in theory, anyway. But in 
practice many, find themselves taking an 
ambivalent stance: They are increasingly 
unsure whether to embrace the paralegals 
as drones who will relieve them of tedium or 
to shun them as trespassers on hallowed le-
gal ground and a threat to the system of 
jurisprudence. 
"We call them paralethals ," says one dis-
dainful New York lawyer who feels that se-
rious mistakes could result from reliance on 
legal help without proper legal training. 
The mixed emotions show up in the posi-
tion of the American Bar Association, which 
says it supports the use of paralegals but 
wants a hand in their training and licensing. 
On the surface, that may seem helpful, but 
William Fry, executive director of the Na-
tional Paralegal Institute in Washington, 
says, "The bar association sees paralegals 
as a hell of a threat. 
A C o m p e t i n g P r o f e s s i o n ? j 
"They feel that if they don't control it, 
through regulation oC the training and li-
censing, it will run away from them," and 
paralegals will emerge as a competing pro-
fession, says Mr. Fry, head of the institute, 
which trains paralegals under federal grants 
for public service positions. 
Part of the problem is that the influx of 
paralegals is coming at the same time that 
a glowing number of law graduates going 
into practice is becoming a problem. Some 
lawyers see paralegals ' making that situa-
tion worse: 
"It's like a steamroller," says Leonard 
Rivkind. past president of the Miami Beach 
Bar Association and a member of the Flor-
ida bar's committee on the unauthorized 
practice of law. "These paralegals are tak-
ing away jobs," he says. "If someone wants 
to practice law. let him go to law school, get 
a license and pract ice." 
Many paralegals, however, say they have 
no interest in spending the time or money it 
would take to go to law school, but they still 
want to do legal work. "I like my job, and I 
don't see any reason to go to law school," 
says Miss Hausberg, who once planned to 
poor clients at the Brooklyn law center, also 
has no plans for law school: "I can do just 
about anything I want to now," she says. "I 
just don't get paid as much as a lawyer." 
• Paralegals start at $10,000 to $11,000 at law 
firms in New York, and may work up to 
$16,000; fledgling lawyers, by contrast, start 
at $18,000 to $20,000. > 
And Mrs. Tackovich, who processes "a 
literal mountain of paperwork" relating to 
tire failure claims and other product liabil-
ity cases at Goodyear, adds that being a 
paralegal is already a step up from her old 
work as legal secretary. "You can set your 
own priorities, and you're not so much un-
der the minute-by-minute supervision of an 
attorney," she says. "The title holds more 
status, too. You're treated as a professional, 
with more consideration." 
**A Growing F i e l d " 
Whatever the reasons for joining it, "This 
is a tremendously growing field." says Al-
bert Greenstone, president of the National 
Center for Paralegal Training in New York.. 
"Six or seven years ago nobody was using 
people specifically designated as legal as-
sistants. Now, 98r/V of the firms with 50 or 
more lawyers use them, and about half the 
firms with 25 to 50 lawyers have legal assist-
ants." 
Estimates are that there are more than 
70,000 paralegals at work, with 20,000 scat-
tered through local, state and federal gov-
ernment offices and most of the rest with 
law 'firms or companies. The number of 
schools offering training has also soared. 
There are 161 programs in paralegal train-
ing being offered now, up from two in 1970 
and zero in 1968, according to Blackstone 
Associates, a Washington research and con-
sulting concern. • 
John Stein, Blackstone vice president, 
says not only are there more paralegals, but 
lawyers are delegating far more work to 
them. "The bar is finally waking up to the 
fact that lawyers have been doing a lot of 
work they really had no business doing. 
They are finding that the whole process of 
delegating some work leads to better repre-
sentation for the client." 
There are, of course, some jobs parale-
gals can't do, such as argue cases in court, 
give legal advice to a client for a fee, or do 
tasks such as taking depositions which 
courts have ruled must be done by a lawyer. 
But that still leaves plenty for the parale-
gals. Miss Hausberg, the Wall Street parale-
gal, says she has "had my hand in a little 
bit of everything" during three years at two 
large law firms. She drafts the final version 
of corporate minutes from notes assembled 
by company officials and has recently pre-
pared research documents on tax shelters 
and on licensing of broker-dealers in various 
states. 
Connie Capistrant, a paralegal at a 
Washington law firm, indexes documents, 
digests depositions and works on an infor-
mation retrieval system to be used in a 
complex antitrust case. Other paralegals 
handle a variety of tasks related to the 
it hadn't been done at all before paralegals 
were hired," she says. 
Working in the Pub l i c Sec tor 
Probably the closest paralegals come to 
acting as practicing attorneys is in the pub-
lic sector, involved in work similar to that of 
Miss Estremera in Brooklyn. She spends 
most of her time representing welfare 
clients at hearings to protest rulings on their 
benefits. The hearings aren' t held in a court-
room before a judge, so a non-lawyer can 
advise a client. Unlike many paralegals, 
Miss Estremera had no formal paralegal 
schooling; she picked up her expertise dur-
ing a stint as a VISTA volunteer. 
Most others get on-the-job training in law 
firms or take courses at schools that offer 
from four months to two years of classes at 
fees of up to $2,200. At this point, they do not 
have to be licensed after leaving school, but 
with the growth in the trade and the interest 
of bar associations, it appears certain that 
attempts to require some sort of qualifying 
will also grow. 
In theory, there should be an immediate 
benefit to clients in the form of lower costs 
resulting from use of paralegals, according , 
to Kenneth Pringle, Minot. N.D.. a t t o r n e y 
who heads the ABA committee on legal as-
sistants, the association's formal name for 
paralegals. He says lower charges will be 
automatic since lawyers are supposed to bill 
their clients at a lower ra te for work done 
by paralegals. 
But the greatest public benefit from 
lower legal costs will be that more citizens 
will be able to afford legal help, says Mr. 
Fry of the National Paralegal Institute. "It 's 
estimated that there are 140 million citizens 
in this country who have legal problems but 
can't afford to pay $25 to $50 or more an 
hour for an attorney." he says. "Paralegals 
have the potential to handle a majority of 
these problems, at a price people could af-
ford to pay." 
Another fertile area for future use of par-
alegals is in pre-paid legal plans, also known 
as "legal insurance." Some large labor 
unions are experimenting with it now, pro-
viding members legal protection for a fixed 
fee, much- like medical insurance. Parale-
gals are "absolutely essential if legal insur-
ance is ever to come through on a wide 
scale," at an affordable cost, says Xenia 
Krinitzky, president of the New York City 
Paralegal Association. 
Looking further ahead, Miss Capistrant. 
who is president of the Capital Area Para-
legal Association, sees major gains 
resulting from paralegals setting up shop.on 
their own, rather than working for lawyers: 
"I think that maybe five or 10 years from 
now, people with a year or two of training 
will be able t a t a k e an exam, get a license, 
and do a will for $50, or a divorce for $100.-
It's coming." 
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Law School Grads Jobs Fe 
WASHINGTON (AP) - Job 
prospects for law school gradu-
ates, already tight, are ex-
pected to remain bleak for at 
least the next 10 years with the 
number of graduates expected 
to outpace the number of job 
openings, the Labor Depart-
ment reported Saturday. 
A study n the current issue 
of the department's Occupation-
al Outlook Quarterly^ says that 
more than 20,000 job openings a 
year are foreseen for lawyers 
through 1985. 
Although not all graduates 
enter practice, the study said 
supply will continue to outpace 
demand with the number of 
graduates rising from 28,300 
this year to an estimated 33,600 
in 1985. 
According to the study: "To-
day's tight job market could re-
solve itself, some optimists say, 
by forcing tomorrow's law stu-
dents to have different ex-
pectations — fewer of themt 
seeking an actual job as a law^ 
yer. 
"A law degree could come to 
be valued primarily as certifi-
cation of high accomplishment 
in the liberal arts. But, for the 
immediate future at least, 
many new law graduates will] 
be disappointed and forced to 
change their career plans. 
"The economy, consequently, 
is required to live with a waste-
ful process and forego the full 
use of valuable, specialized 
skills/* i 
The study noted that the 
number of people practicing 
law has increased by more 
than 100,000 since the early 
1960s, reaching a total of about 
342,000 in 1974. During the same 
period, the number of law 
school graduates increased 
about threefold. 
Law school admission policies 
apparently were a major factor 
in the oversupply, the study 
said, explaining that while 
many colleges offer prelaw pro-
grams, undergraduate training 
in almost any field is accepted 
by law schools as proper prepa-
ration for admittance. 
Because of this, in recent 
years, many undergraduates 
chose to enter law school as the 
job market in the physical and 
biological sciences tightened::** 
Also, law has become popular 
for social reasons, with the-de-
gree now viewed as "an impor-
tant key to full participation in 
constructive legal, political and 
economic changes," the study 
said. •'.;**' 
PARALEGALS 
L e g a l assistants: Who needs 
them? The real question is: Who 
couldn't use one? The legal assistant, 
under the supervision of a lawyer, is 
able to give direct assistance in han-
dling all matters, from preparing and 
interpreting legal documents to 
analyzing and handling procedural 
problems that involve independent 
decisions. 
In the law office, the duties of 
paralegals, as they are sometimes 
called, are limited only by the practice 
of the employer-attorney. Paralegals 
assume many of the routine adminis-
trative and time-consuming duties 
formerly borne by the attorney. 
At the same time, they are more ac-
cessible than the attorney, and can 
spend time interviewing the clients, 
and giving them more personal atten-
tion. This gives the attorney more 
time for productive legal work, and 
keeps the clients satisfied. 
It's not just within the law offices 
that paralegals are serving a need. In 
our courts, paralegals can be found in 
many positions, among them law li-
brarian, court administrator, and 
chief deputy. Their duties are varied, 
but they all help to expedite necessary 
procedures handled every day in 
court. 
So, if you're finding that you're hav-
ing trouble answering all of your calls, 
completing all your research, and 
drafting all of your procedures, per-
haps what you need is a legal assis-
tant. The legal assistant's services can 
be had at a reasonable price, and he or 
she offers invaluable assistance in all 
areas. 
I In any of the given fields, the 
j paralegal can develop and modify pro-
cedures, detail procedures for practic-
ing in certain fields of law, research, 
compile, and use information from the 
law library, and keep everyone up-to-
date on the current cases in the office. 
The list of things paralegals can do 
, is endless. They serve a distinct need. 
1
 And operating within established 
ethical guidelines, they are bringing 
j initiative, knowledge, training, and 
j dedication to their jobs. 
I —• 
Mary Ellen Buehring, PLS, CPS, is 
Public Relations Chairman of the Na-
tional A ssociation of Legal A ssistants, 
Inc. TfZiFfL 
November/December 1975 
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